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The Relevance and Applicability of Process 
Metaphysics to Organizational Research 
 
Per Ingvar Olsen 
 
Process metaphysics (process philosophy) has been suggested as a route, to a more “process-based” approach to 
organizational studies, as opposed to a “substance-based” view said to be dominant in Western thinking - including 
most contemporary organizational researchers. This paper explores into some of the ideas of early 20th century process 
thinkers and provides an interpretation of some of the major work of Alfred N. Whitehead. The objective is to 
evaluate its possible relevance to modern organizational research. The paper argues that Whitehead’s radical ontology 
- that was based on a generalization of quantum theory in physics - appears largely to have been refuted or disregarded 
by succeeding process philosophers. Furthermore, his epistemology is found to represent a process view on scientific 
knowledge creation taken for granted by most contemporary researchers. For different reasons, major elements of his 
theories do not appear to be directly relevant to efforts to advance organizational theory into more radical process based 
theories.   
 
On the other hand, the paper argues that the early 20th century process thinkers – including Whitehead - offer a 
plurality of analytical conceptions that may serve as useful and inspirational contributions to further development of 
methods and perspectives to investigate into organizations, change and innovation processes. There are also particular 
approaches within the domain that have properties quite similar to some of those conceptions in process philosophy – 
like “sensemaking processes” as represented by Karl Weick and others, which may in particular benefit from 
exploring the area of process philosophy. 
 
Introduction 
 
The topic of organizational change processes - including those focusing on innovation 
processes - is central to organization studies. Like any other area of science there is a flux of new 
ideas, new conceptualizations and also new “re-discoveries” of old ideas that are offered to the 
debate on how to frame new research initiatives, how to improve our methods of investigation and 
how to conceptualize such a phenomenon as “organization” in order to further advance theory. 
This is all very good. However, in the wake of a number of creative suggestions and contributions, 
there is also a time for some critical evaluations and assessments. 
In this paper I would like to address and to critically examine a particular strand of thought that 
has been suggested by several writers over the last few years, and that continues to attract interest, 
namely the idea that process philosophy in the tradition of early 20th century philosophers such as 
Alfred N. Whitehead, Henri Bergson and William James, can and should be productively applied to 
organizational research and theorizing.1
                                                 
1 See, for example Chia R (1999) A Rhizomic” model of organizational change and transformation: 
Perspective from a metaphysics of change British Journal of Management 10: 209-227; Tsoukas, H, and Chia R 
(2002): “On organizational becoming: Rethinking organizational change”, Organization Science 13/5: 567-582; 
Styhre, A (2004): “Rethinking knowledge: A Bergsonian critique of the notion of tacit knowledge”, British 
Journal of Management 15: 177-188; Hernes, T and Bakken T (2006): “Organizing is Both a Verb and a Noun: 
Weick Meets Whitehead, Organizational Studies 27(11): 1-18; Carlsen, A (2006): “Organizational becoming as 
dialogic imagination of practice: The case of indomitable Gauls”, Organization Science 17/1: 132-149; Bordum, 
A (2007): “Managing Innovation Potential: Revising Plato and Reading John Dewey as a Philosopher of 
Innovation Management”, Philosophy of Management, vol 6, no 1. 
 The line of reasoning is also presented in brief by Van de 
 3 
Ven & Poole in their discussion of various ontological and epistemological positions underlying 
different methods for studying organizational change2
In particular Chia and Tsoukas have argued that our current theories of change are not 
sufficiently “process-based” to adequately capture the dynamics of change, and that the 
introduction of process metaphysics to organizational change theory represents an important and 
potent step forward. While they also acknowledge that there has indeed been a substantial amount 
of research based on “process views” within organizational research, with numerous references at 
least back to Cyert and March’s  book “The Behavioral Theory of the Firm”, they essentially argue 
that even the most radical attempts (like that of comparing organizational process to improvisation 
in jazz) fail to advance process theory to a sufficiently radical level. Such radical insights, they claim, 
“will be drawn out only if their calls for greater attention to process lead to a consistent reversal of 
the ontological priority accorded to organization and change.”
. 
3
The work by Styhre, Hernes & Bakken, Carlsen and Bordum are all interesting recent examples 
of work where conceptions inspired or derived from process thinking represented by various 
process philosophers (Bergson, Whitehead, James and Dewey respectively) have either been applied 
to empirical studies (Carlsen), to analytical comparisons with the work of prominent organizational 
scientists, such as Weick, along with further refinements of conceptions of language for 
organizational studies (Hernes & Bakken), or to analytical comparison and development of 
conceptions of knowledge and knowledge potential in organizations as well as in innovation 
processes (Styhre, Bordum). Tsoukas and Chia similarly draw inspiration and conceptions from 
Bergson and James. In particular they seem to share some of the enthusiasm for “intuitive” ways of 
experiencing “true insights” with those of Bergson, as opposed to the more analytical approach 
generally favoured in scientific inquiry.
 They then suggest a theory of 
“Organizational Becoming” as a foundational approach to understand “the pervasiveness of change 
in organizations”.  
4 All of these illustrates that at least at the conceptual level, 
these philosophers have something to contribute to organization and management studies. 5
 
 
The Metaphysics of change 
As a point of departure however, I will provide a few quotes from the interesting work 
presented by Chia.6
“..there has been little attempt to understand the nature of change on its own terms and to 
treat stability, order and organizations as exceptional states” (The author’s italics).  
 He argues that:  
Rather, he suggests to:  
“..draw on the relatively forgotten tradition of process philosophers to throw fresh light on 
to the true nature of change and to explore genuinely alternative approaches to the 
understanding of organizational change, renewal and transformation. It pits a metaphysics of 
change in which primacy is accorded to movement, change and transformation, against the 
still-dominant Parmediean-inspired metaphysics of substance which elevates stability, 
permanence and order.”7
The process metaphysical approach is accordingly said to represent a potent as well as radical 
departure from dominant western thought in line with “Parmediean substance thought” said to be 
taken for granted by most organizational change researchers. 
 
It is furthermore argued that such a radical departure from familiar modes of organizational 
theorizing has direct implications for our thinking about the management of organizations:  
                                                 
2Cf Van de Ven, A and Poole M S (2005): “Alternative Approaches for Studying Organizational Change”, 
Organizational Studies 26(9): 1377 – 1404; There is a comprehensive literature within contemporary philosophy 
covering a wide range of topics addressed by Whitehead and the other process philosophers. The topics I 
have chosen to address here are limited to providing a brief overview of what is held by some of those others 
to be important aspects and at the same time that I assume are relevant to a discussion of its relevance to the 
contemporary discussion within organizational change theory. At the same time, it might serve as a brief 
introductory to those unfamiliar with Whitehead’s process theory.  
3 Tsoukas and Chia: op cit p 570. 
4 ibid p 571. 
5 It appears that Rescher ’s introductory book to Process Metaphysics (1996) has served as a mediating 
medium for a substantial chare of the new interest in process philosophy among organizational researchers.  
6 Op cit 1999 
7 ibid p210 
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“If we follow the logic of this alternative metaphysics of change to its logical conclusion, it 
would imply that the management of change must, accordingly, entail, not the deliberate 
change oriented form of external intervention so much preferred by conventional 
organizational change theorists and practitioners, but the alternative relaxing of the 
artificially-imposed (that is culturally-inspired) structures of relations: the loosening up of 
organizations. Such a relaxing strategy will allow the intrinsic change forces, always kept in 
check by the restrictive bonds of organizations, to express themselves naturally and 
creatively. According to this understanding, therefore, change occurs naturally and of its 
own volition once the invisible hand of cultural intervention is removed.” 8
And later on Chia concludes that:  
 
“What this means is that “organizational change” is not something that needs deliberate 
intervention or orchestration. Instead, merely relaxing the deeply entrenched organizational 
and institutionalized habits, which keep “organizations” together and which enable them to 
be thought of as “thing-like”, is itself sufficient to allow change to occur of its own 
volition. It is this “hands-off” attitude towards organizational change which is the implicit 
advocacy of this process metaphysical mindset.” 9
Hence, Chia suggests that a process metaphysical theory in a direct sense can be seen to inform 
the area of organizational change theory in a far reaching sense. It is held that it is possible to 
deduce particular theories about organizations directly from such a philosophy, and that it is 
possible to conclude something in particular that appears to have a fairly strong normative and 
instrumental character, for instance with respect to how managers should go about managing 
organizational change (or rather “not-managing”) or how they should manage (or not-manage) 
organizations in more general terms. This, I will argue, is to draw out implications and assumptions 
far too far. It seems to me to represent a mode of arguing that is quite the opposite of what I 
believe was held to be a fundamental point in Whitehead’s epistemology, a mode of arguing that 
Whitehead denoted “The fallacy of misplaced concreteness”, which may be interpreted as the 
temptation to confuse something deduced from creative analytical conceptions (a purely mental 
process that extend from time and space constraints) with knowledge about something of actual 
existence in the empirical world.  
 
To make my point here, I will have to provide an interpretation of some essential points in 
process theory. In doing so, I will concentrate on a discussion of Whitehead’s cosmological10
One of the major contributions by process philosophy, as represented by Whitehead, was that 
it offered a theoretical solution at the level of epistemology, to the historical conflict between 
rationalism and historical empiricism and their mutual inabilities to explain exactly how we may 
have certain/true knowledge in our minds about whatever of nature. Whitehead’s revolutionary 
theory (at the time) was suggesting that we may not have absolutely certain or true knowledge, only 
asymptotically so, and that the uncertain ontological knowledge that we have, must result from the 
interaction of creative conceptions of mind with perceptions of things physically existing in time 
and space (that is nowadays referred to as “the empirical”). This interaction of conceptual thinking 
and perception of actual entities he called “prehension” - a wording that is somewhat unfortunate, 
as the word that has later come to be used for approximately the same epistemological 
phenomenon is rather “proposition.”
 theory 
addressed with an emphasis on interpretations of the historical and philosophical context to where 
it was contributed at the time. Even though the references noted above rather concern some of the 
other process thinkers, I believe Whitehead’s work is both fundamental and representative to the 
understanding of the tradition.  
11
                                                 
8 ibid p 211 
  That is: we can have knowledge about the actualities of the 
world in the form of “propositions”, or “theories” or “hypothesis” that are constantly being 
attempted revised and can thereby overall be described in terms of an evolving knowledge process.  
9 ibid p 225 
10 The word cosmology refers to a more constrained extension of the philosophy than the term metaphysics. 
In particular Whitehead’s theory of God is not included in his cosmology, whereas God is included in his 
metaphysics. 
11 Leclerc, I (1990): “Whitehead and the Dichotomy of Rationalism and Empiricism”, in Rapp, Friedrich and 
Reiner Wiehl (eds): Whitehead’s Metaphysics of Creativity, State University of New York Press pp 14-17 
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Whitehead’s ontological theory about “actual entities” is carried over to this “process 
epistemology”, as the fundamental conception that also mental activities must be interpreted as 
subjected to evolutionary change over time and thereby contribute to the evolution of theory that 
constitute “what we know”. Now, this Whiteheadian theory is not revolutionary anymore, as it is in 
fact embraced by the empirical sciences as the almost taken for granted understanding of what 
constitute modern scientific activities. Most of us nowadays tend to have such a process 
understanding of knowledge about actual phenomena, not a “fixed substance” like one. And, it 
should perhaps also be stressed here: Whitehead did not “invent” the way modern empirical 
sciences have essentially been conducted and interpreted through out the last century. He merely 
formulated a cosmological theory to explain the relationship between modern science practices, as 
they were, and an overall interpretation at the ontological and epistemological level of analysis. 
A possible source of the apparent confusion in the wake of the new “re-discovery” of process 
philosophy, can possibly be found within Whitehead’s philosophy itself, in the part of his theory 
where he attempted to generalize across all of the sciences as well as to the universe in its totality 
(apart from God), to a new and complete “process based relativity theory” which also included a 
new conception of space/time. He approached this ambition from the – at the time - new quantum 
theory in physics. In this part of his philosophy he suggested that “substances do not exist” apart 
from in the form of “micro events” that “prehend” into one another and that are everywhere 
connected to one another to form “societies of events” that come to represent what we perceive of 
as “the actual entities of the world”12 – for instance a human being, a machine or an organization. 
The classical view of an atom was based on the principle that atoms cannot be cut up or broken 
into smaller parts, thereby constituting fixed substances as the ultimate micro foundation of all 
matters of the world. The new quantum theory broke “atoms apart” into collections of fluctuating 
processes that organized into relative stability by statistical regularities – that is, by regularities at the 
level of aggregated phenomena. What was usually deemed as a physical thing, a stable durable 
object, was itself based on nothing but a statistical pattern of processes.13
This is the fundamental point that Whitehead drew upon in his effort to provide a new 
theoretical basis to relativity theory and to reconstrue space-time as well as the conceptions of other 
physical and mental objects as being instances of “fragmentary individual micro-experiences”. It is 
the basis for Whitehead’s “epochal theory of time” or “atomic theory of time” - that might perhaps 
more precisely be denoted as a “quantum theory of time”. However, there appears to be fairly 
broad consensus among process philosophers that this part of his theory was far too radical, and 
that it has not been verified by “our immediate experiences” outside of physics. In particular, it is 
not clear that Whitehead’s representation of entities as we generally perceive of them at the level of 
everyday perception, has much to gain from being represented as “societies of fluctuating micro-
events”. Furthermore, the actual existence of Whitehead’s microscopic “actual occasions” has not 
been proven. Hence, it tends to be refuted as a theory – or disregarded.
  
14
It is a striking impression from some of the literature on process philosophy as discussed 
within organization studies, that what for instance Whitehead apparently saw as a meta theory that 
incorporated all the sciences as they actually were conducting their research at the time (in particular in 
physics and biology) is found by some modern researchers to have both specific and radical 
implications for some particular area of research, which even is said to point away from those 
modes of modern research within that area in which it is dominantly thought of and conducted. I 
would accordingly like to address this paradoxical discussion by focusing on some of the different 
levels that the idea of process may be usefully derived and possibly applied to organizational change 
and innovation process studies; at the level of process metaphysics, at the level of analytical 
conception (the “idea of process”), and at the level of methods for conducting process studies.   
 Reference to and 
application of Whitehead’s radical ontological theory of becoming of actual entities, accordingly 
risks a bit of confusion when “translated” to, say, modern organization theory.   
 
 
                                                 
12 Eslick argues that also Whitehead’s actual entities are based on the idea of a unitary ultimate rigid entity as 
the fundamental building blocks for an ontological theory about nature. Hence, he points out that Whitehead 
is not really solving the problem of change. Eslick, L (1958): “Substance, Change and Causality in 
Whitehead”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 18: 503-13 
13 Rescher N (1996) Process metaphysics: An introduction to process philosophy. Albany, NY: SUNY Press p 98 
14 cf  Rescher op cit, or Eslick op cit 
 6 
What is process philosophy? 
Nicholas Rescher has offered an introduction to the area of process metaphysics (or process 
philosophy)15
According to Rescher, process philosophy can be characterized as theories that hold that 
process has primacy over things, that substance is subordinated to process, that things are simply 
constellations of processes. Or it holds that process has priority over substance, which implies that 
things are always subordinated to processes because processes inwardly engender, determine, and 
characterize the things there are. The opposite view is seen as represented by similar but opposite 
forms of “substance views”. Of the two types of process thought, the one that holds that process 
has primacy over things is associated with “a strong” (Heraclitean) view. Whitehead’s quantum 
theory of “actual occasions” is a theory within this category. The other type that holds that process 
only has priority over things, is referred to as the weak (Empedoclean) version.
, and to the major philosophers associated with the tradition. He also introduces the 
overall perspective, basic contentions and a brief overview of the various areas of thought broadly 
addressed within process philosophy. Rescher states that a characteristic of metaphysics is to 
articulate ideational perspectives to provide a framework for understanding the world about us and 
our place within it. It need not be designed to compete with what is represented by everyday 
knowledge and scientific understanding, but it can – indeed, should – absorb and supplement them 
within one comprehensive and harmonious overarching perspective. Hence, by nature metaphysics 
at its best is integrative and illuminating across sciences, and process philosophy is said to have met 
considerable success with this regard.  
16
The most noted process philosophers of the early 20th century are the following: Charles 
Sanders Pierce, William James, Henri Bergson, John Dewey, Alfred N. Whitehead and Wilmon H. 
Sheldon. As their primary antecedents, Rescher points at Leibnitz and Hegel. In particular Leibnitz’ 
early theory of “monads” (units) understood as “bundles of process activity” or “centres of force” 
that he saw as constituting the phenomena of the world rather than any sort of fixed substances, 
came to represent a particular influence on Whitehead’s effort to expand quantum theory to a 
general ontology.
 It appears that 
Whitehead’s refuted radical “quantum theory of actual occasions” is the major representative of the 
first type among the 20th century process philosophers, at least the one that is commonly referred 
to. “The strong view” with regard to the ontological status of process holding primacy over 
substance, has thereby possibly “lost” its core reference.  
17 Hegel’s dialectical conception of process appears to have been relatively more 
influential in Sheldon’s later theory of bipolar tensions, or “creative polar opposites” in which the 
tension between opposites is seen to engender change processes.18
There are considerable differences between those philosophers associated under the process 
philosophy umbrella. A major kind of difference has its roots in what type of process is taken as 
paradigmatic. For instance, Whitehead saw physics as the paramount process type from where he 
generalized across other areas of science. Charles S. Pierce and Henri Bergson on the other hand 
saw biological processes as fundamental, whereas William James based his ideas on a psychological 
model. Sheldon, like Whitehead, took physics as fundamental, but rather electromagnetism than 
quantum theory. Another difference is that while Whitehead (being a mathematician for 40 years 
before he became a philosopher) articulated his theories in strict scientific terms, others – like 
Bergson – relied on intuitive reflection. These various process philosophers can accordingly not be 
seen as representing one “school of thought”, but rather appear to be associated under an umbrella 
with a limited set of joint contentions. Neither can we say that any of them, in any dominant sense, 
saw themselves as part of a joint school of thought, even though for instance Whitehead in his 
introductory to “Process and Reality” wrote that:  
 
“I am also greatly indebted to Bergson, William James, and John Dewey. One of my 
preoccupations has been to rescue their type of thought from the charge of anti-
intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been associated with it” 19
If anything particular is common to all the early 20th century process philosophers, it is perhaps 
their relationship to evolutionary Darwinism, which had emerged as a fundamental scientific and 
  
                                                 
15 He also offers an extended bibliography on the tradition 
16 See Tsoukas & Chia and Hernes & Bakken opera cit; also Van de Ven, A and Poole M S op cit (2005 
17 Leclerc, 1990 op cit 
18 Rescher op cit p 24 
19 Whitehead, A N. (1978): Process and Reality, New York: The Free Press p xii 
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philosophical revolution at the time20
It is also clear that process philosophers in the main do not deny things (substances). Rather 
they re-conceptualize them as manifolds of process.
. Process philosophy, in particular the Whiteheadian and the 
Bergsonian versions, represent particular solutions to the theological challenges associated with the 
unification of natural evolution with the creative role of God – in which a process view of 
“creation” for obvious reasons provided an attractive new set of propositions. All of them also tend 
to stress the primacy of activity over passivity and to draw on a range of associated factors such as 
change, creativity, innovation, time and so forth, while maintaining that these conceptions are basic 
to our understanding of the world.  
21 On this basis it might as well be concluded 
that “the weak view” has reached some consensus among modern process philosophers, in the 
acknowledgment that the primary controversy between the process view and the substance view is 
rather based on conceptual than ontological distinctions, and accordingly is one of relative priority 
rather than of primacy.22
 
 
Whitehead’s metaphysics of creativity in historical perspective 
Whitehead stands out as the most influential representative of Process Philosophy – a 
reflection also of the impressive ambitions and creative intellectual contributions that he 
represented. I will now give some considerations to the work of Whitehead on the basis of an 
historical perspective on his work. 
First of all, we need to understand Whitehead within his own historical and philosophical 
context in order to make sense of what kind of issues his theories were struggling to solve, and on 
that basis, of what we may take from it within the domain of organizational and management 
research. This is of course not an easy task, as there obviously are different interpretations of 
Whitehead’s philosophy represented among philosophers. In the following I mainly draw from a 
brief presentation offered by Ivor Leclerc.23 Furthermore, such an understanding also requires an 
account of the ontological foundations of the entire modern development of philosophy, where 
even a brief outline requires some space to elaborate.24
Rather than the claim for a linear line of dominance within western thought all the way back to 
the ancient Greeks as advocated by some, the route is probably better seen as one of occasional 
major shifts. One of these is represented by the rise of modern science and philosophy in rejection 
to traditional natural science and philosophy as represented by Aristotelian scholasticism. It 
emerged on a basis of what is commonly denoted “neoplatonism,” that developed through the 
work of Augustine and Descartes and came to dominate in the sciences of the seventeenth century.  
  
 
Whitehead’s ontology as opposed to the ontology of “neoplatonism” 
In his preface to “Process and Reality”, Whitehead positions his cosmological work in relation 
to the following: 
“In order to obtain a reasonably complete account of human experience considered in 
relation to philosophical problems which naturally arise, the group of philosophers and 
scientists belonging to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been considered, in 
                                                 
20 Evolutionary biology has of course had a tremendous impact also on areas like in Organisational Theory  
(for instance in the Freeman and Hannan (1977) tradition) as well as within Economics 
21 Rescher  op cit p 51 
22 Process philosophy has had its stronghold in the United States (Where also Whitehead conducted nearly all 
his philosophical work while at Harvard), in particular within the area of Process Theology where followers 
such as Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, Lewis S. Ford and John B. Cobb Jr. have kept it vibrant. The 
establishing of the Society for Process Studies, the journal “Process Studies” and the “Center for Process 
Studies” in Clairmont California in the early 1970s appears to represent a vitalization of the tradition more 
broadly. It also appears to have been “rediscovered” in Germany in the latter part of the same decade, or 
perhaps rather translated from the US to German philosophers. 
23 Leclerc op cit 
24 For other historical accounts, see for instance Ford, L (1984): The Emergence of Whitehead’s Metaphysics, 
Albany: State University of New York Press; Wulf-Gazo, E (1990): “Whitehead and Berkeley: On the True 
Nature of Sense Perception”, in Rapp, Friedrich and Reiner Wiehl (eds): Whitehead’s Metaphysics of Creativity, 
State University of New York Press; Lowe, V(1981): “Alfred North Whitehead: A Biographical Perspective” 
in Holz, Harald and Ernest Wolf-Gazo (eds): Whitehead and The Idea of Process, Verlag Karl Alber GmbH 
Freiburg/München 
 
 8 
particular Descartes, Newton, Locke, Hume, Kant. Any one of these writers is one-sided in 
his presentation of the groundwork of experience; but as a whole they give a general 
presentation which dominates the development of subsequent philosophy…a careful 
examination of their exact statements disclosed that in the main the philosophy of 
organism is a recurrence to pre-Kantian modes of thought. These philosophers were 
perplexed by inconsistent presuppositions underlying their inherited modes of expression.” 
25
Hence, Whitehead positions his “philosophy of organism” in clear opposition to what he 
perceived of as the dominant neoplatonist philosophy at the time. The basic ontological doctrine of 
neoplatonism is that what “is” must be immutable, which in the strictest sense was represented by 
the existence of God. However, since abstract representations of real entities (“forms”) were also 
seen as changeless in themselves, they too were considered “beings” in this strict sense. In the 
traditional platonist view, forms in enaction constituted “soul” (thoughts), which entails that souls 
too were considered “beings”. However, in the traditional view these “souls” were seen as being the 
principals of agency embodied in the physical as their acting rationales rather than “beings” in 
themselves. In the neoplatonist doctrine this idea of embodiment disappeared. All change 
(becoming) now pertained strictly to the physical, to the realm of nature, maintaining a strict 
distinction between the acting agency of the soul on the one hand, and the becoming of the 
physical on the other.
 
26
This considerable modification that came to be introduced in the seventeenth century centred 
on a new interpretation of matter. In the classical view, matter pertained to the physical as the 
recipient of “form”, and was having an ontological status that was contrary to that of form, namely 
that of “not-being”. This interpretation gradually changed into an understanding where the physical 
was seen as constituted by matter alone – as opposed to the classical conception of the physical as 
composite of both form and matter. From now on, matter alone constituted “being” in terms of 
everything physical, where as the classical understanding of “form” evaporated. This turn is what 
constituted a distinct and gradually dominant “substance view” of the world. 
  
Descartes was the first to appreciate fully the philosophical implications of this new theory of 
nature. Matter had become an ultimate. It was simply matter, being everywhere the same and 
thereby incapable of changing into anything else. Matter had become the ultimate “being” as 
opposed to its previous “not-being” status. Descartes also noted that qualitative categories no 
longer had any meaning in relation to matter. Hence, the category of quantity remained as the only 
relevant one – due to matter’s’ extension in space. This permitted for the dominant role Descartes 
then gave to mathematics in the philosophy of nature. Descartes further recognized that the logical 
implication of this was a metaphysical duality of two separate “worlds of beings”. In addition to the 
physical, there is the one constituted by souls (thinking, intellect). This metaphysical dualism 
profoundly affected subsequent philosophy, represented a complete breach with the traditional 
view of “soul” as an active force included in physical nature, representing the principle of life, of 
emotion and of agency. The physical had become passive – without any capacity to influence. Only 
“soul” was active. On the other hand, “soul” had lost all of its associations apart from the activity 
of “thinking” (intelligence).  
All this carried through into subsequent philosophy through Locke, Hume and Kant, where it 
came to represent the foundation for both empiricism and rationalism in the 18th and 19th centuries, 
which later came to represent taken for granted presuppositions for late 19th and early 20th century 
process philosophers. It was this inheritance that Whitehead gradually opposed, in comparison to 
which he finally came to represent a renewal of metaphysical philosophy presented for the first time 
in his Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh University in June 1928, published in “Process and Reality” 
the year after. 
In doing this he embarked on a theory of an indefinite plurality of ultimate beings that he 
termed “actual entities”, inspired by both quantum theory in physics, evolutionary biology and 
Leibnitz’ theory of “monads”. However, where as “monads” were conceived of as neoplatonic 
souls, Whitehead’s entities are not souls, but are rather bipolar conceptions of both physical and 
mental content - fundamentally similar to the Aristotelian view27
                                                 
25 Whitehead, op cit p xi 
. Whitehead maintained - as did 
26 Leclerc op cit p 2 
27 As argued by Felt Whitehead actually misinterpreted the Aristotelian conception of ”substance” (Ousia), 
thereby causing some ambiguity on the side of Whitehead as to the interpretation of Arestotelian process 
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Aristotle - that the physical must be understood as “in a process of becoming”, which entailed that 
the physical must be “acting”. This acting at the level of ontology, he denoted “prehending”.  
Whitehead made a distinction between two kinds of acting; physical acting (physical 
prehending) and mental (conceptual) acting (mental prehending). Physical acting is conceived to be 
the acting of actual entities in reference to one or more other actual entities. Mental or conceptual 
acting however, is the acting of an actual entity with reference to “eternal objects”. In the 
neoplatonist view, soul is “pure action”, which is to say that it cannot be “acted upon” by other 
souls, which constitutes a purely subjectivist foundation for knowledge of data. Whitehead, on the 
contrary, maintained a necessary objectivism as to his “data”, which he argued represent a necessary 
foundation for any claim to “scientific knowledge”.  
He explains his position on this in Adventures of Ideas where he points out that “for an actual 
entity to be an “object” (data) for a prehending actual entity (interpreter), necessitates the former 
being “given”, which means that it is antecedent to the latter, affirming that thus an object must be 
a thing received, and must neither be a mode of reception or a thing generated in that occasion.”28
Whitehead’s notion “prehension” can more precisely be understood as “interacting”, and 
physical prehension can better be understood as “interactions among actual entities”. This can be 
compared with his notion of “mental prehension” or “conceptual prehension” in which data are 
“eternal objects” (conceptual abstractions). Whitehead held that the pure mental or conceptual 
prehension is an autonomous act. It is not a “being acted upon” like physical prehension. It is a 
mental “grasping” or “conceiving” of the “forms” in abstraction as derived from their physical 
determination of actual entities.  
 He 
clearly perceived of this “receiving” of the object of study (data) not as a passive situation, but one 
in which the data were also “acting” on the observer. This situation is what he referred to as 
“creativity”, in which the emergence of a new reality results from the interactivity of the actual 
world with the new in the actual act of creating the new. This is what is essentially contained in his 
notion of “physical acting” and the “continuity of physical activity”.  
He furthermore denoted this derivation a “conceptual valuation”, which he then distinguished 
from another autonomous kind of mental act denoted “conceptual reversion”. The latter is the 
conceiving of form which is “reverse” or “opposite” or “contrary” to that of conceptual valuation. 
It is by the power of “conceptual reversion” that possibilities divergent from those derived from 
the data become accessible, which provides the basis for explaining the concept of “imagination”. 
Mental prehension is thereby not constrained by time and space, where as physical prehension is.  
Whitehead refers to mental acting and physical acting as differences in kind, and does not 
ascribe to mental acting any independent ontological status, as did neoplatonism. He holds that the 
actual entities that have ontological status, require both kinds since both are needed for the 
understanding of nature, and neither is reducible to or derivable from the other. Hence, 
conceptions created by mindful thought must interact with “influential” data of whatever physically 
exists in time-space, in order for there to be any understanding of what is. The “influence” 
capability of such “data” results from the complex and interconnected creative mental and physical 
interactions given in their “processes of becoming”. In line with this, the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness refers to the tendency to claim knowledge about objects in the real world simply by 
deductions from what is contained in autonomous acts of mental reflection. 
 
 
Whitehead’s epistemology as opposed to epistemology of historical rationalism and 
empiricism  
On the basis of this bipolar ontological theory of actual entities, Whitehead developed an 
epistemology that evaded severe difficulties in the epistemologies of historical empiricism and 
rationalism, namely the problem of the knowledge of nature. This problem had been a primary 
concern to historical empiricism. On the basis of the neoplatonist ontology, sensuous perception is 
purely a mental act, an autonomous act of the mind. In the mind this gave rise to “ideas” of 
sensation in terms of “qualities” that referred to the mind alone, not to material things (matter). 
Hence these “sensuous ideas” were essentially “universals” that could not be seen as particulars 
                                                                                                                                               
thinking. Felt, J (1985): “Whitehead’s Misconception of “Substance” in Aristotle”, Process Studies, (14/4): 224-
236 
 
28 Whitehead, A N. (1933): Adventures of ideas. London: Pelican Books 8,  229. 
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within the world of ordinary things. In the historical empiricist theory there is accordingly no basis 
for any direct knowledge of physical things other than by inference, which led Locke to maintain 
that valid inference is possible, where as Hume did not, holding that there could not be genuine 
knowledge of nature – only a “probability” of such. 29
Core to Whitehead’s rejection of both the empiricist and the rationalist positions, was his view 
on two particular characteristics of traditional thinking; the idea of genuine knowledge as necessarily 
“intuitive”, and the idea of knowledge as necessarily “certain”. The conception of knowledge as 
“intuitive” derives from Plato’s noesis of the forms. This corresponded with the neoplatonic 
doctrine of the soul and was essential to Descartes claim that knowledge is essentially 
“mathematical” - as the foremost example of knowledge as intuitive. The conception of “certain” is 
also taken from Plato, but changed significantly as a result of the neoplatonist interpretation. Plato 
held that knowledge (episteme) per se was “true” and thus “not false”. This however, is 
significantly different from “certainty” because “certainty” rather refers to the thinking subject than 
to the definition of true knowledge per se. Descartes required this “feeling of certainty” on the side 
of the thinker, as the authorization of authentic “knowledge”. This idea was then accepted by later 
thinkers of both rationalistic and empiricist orientation. To this Whitehead argued that we cannot 
know “what a thing is” by merely thinking of mathematical patterns or equations. On the contrary 
Whitehead insisted that empirical investigation is required for us to have knowledge of what is. 
Hence, Whitehead rejected both the conception that knowledge is “intuitive” in this sense, and the 
idea that knowledge necessarily had to be “certain.” 
 
30
Whitehead accordingly maintained that genuine knowledge of nature necessitates the 
perception of physical entities. This however, required a different analysis of perception than that 
of the empiricists. Firstly, he rejected the presupposition of traditional thinking that vivid sensuous 
perception has the status of ultimacy (certainty required ultimacy). He held that perception is part 
of the physical and mental ‘actings’ of actual entities and hence cannot be ultimate, but rather may 
change along with new actings. He argued that the first requirement is to admit that there is a 
physical acting (or influence) by the perceived actualities on to the perceiver. This physical 
interacting does not alone constitute perception. So, the second requirement is that perception also 
requires mental acting by the perceiver. Knowledge accordingly, requires interacting between pure 
mental acting and physical interacting, an integration, or synthesis, of the conceptual and the 
physical.  
 
This integration of mental acting and physical interaction is what constitutes a “proposition”. 
This comes about as follows: Mental prehension refers to conceptions representing abstract 
potentiality, meaning they have a completely general reference to any actual entity. In a proposition, 
there is no such generality, as the mentally conceived conception is integrated with a particular 
actual entity (or several) physically received. Some particular mental conception is being “proposed” 
as the hypothetical definiteness for those actual entities. Given the distinction between conceptual 
valuations and conceptual reversion, the number of possible “proposals” is unlimited. This 
propositional integration, according to Whitehead, is the basis for all perception based knowledge 
of nature. That is to say: sensuous perception is not a direct intuition of physical things; it is a 
proposition about them. All thought related to the actualities of the world, must necessarily be 
propositional – or theoretical. 31
Throughout the history of modern science, the view that scientific investigation and knowledge 
proceed by the method of hypothesis, propositions and hence “theory” has been gradually 
accepted, and also that perception of the empirical is related to analytical conceptions of mind. 
Whitehead’s conclusion that scientific knowledge per se is “propositional” or “theory” is also 
generally accepted. It was the lack of adequate philosophical basis for this doctrine that was 
Whitehead’s concern, not that any of the scientific activities within the empirical sciences at the 
time was not in conformity with his theory. 
  
 
The relevance of process metaphysics to organizational theory 
                                                 
29 Leclerc op cit p11 
30 Whitehead ibid pp 12-13 
31 ibid p 15 
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Victor Lowe describes Whitehead as “one of the most quoted philosophers of our century – 
and one of the least understood.”32
First, like any other phenomenon we study within the realm of the social, cosmological 
philosophy needs to be interpreted within its historical and theoretical context. To infer that written 
documents nearly a century old, and related to the contextually given understanding then, would 
present an idea in the same manner as the same documents indicate to us today, is likely to be 
inaccurate. To take a process perspective: the world has been moving on, and so have our 
conceptions and taken for granted presuppositions. It is for instance not evident that a focus on 
“microscopic” change, as advocated by Tsoukas and Chia
 At the very least his work is not easy to comprehend, in part 
due to the highly scientific form of his way of expressing himself, particularly in his original 
wording. I shall not claim that I have understood Whitehead entirely, as the outline above clearly 
depends more on my interpretation of those interpreting Whitehead, than it rests with any serious 
independent inquiry into his writing (assuming that while being a social scientist, it might be better 
to trust the evaluations of other philosophers than to try to become one). My essential point by 
drawing this outline of an historical evaluation of Whitehead’s metaphysical theory, is to indicate 
that the appeal to early 20th century metaphysical theory in order to inform a more “fundamental”, 
“genuine” or “true” process-thinking within organization studies, might possibly be flawed in 
several respects.  
33
Second, cosmological theory such as the one represented by Whitehead, is based on 
generalized interpretations of scientific practice as they were actually conducted at the time. It is 
fairly unlikely that such a theory represents a position from which to radically transform the way 
anyone of the particular sciences might go about doing their research – or that it should be 
expected to provide authoritative guidelines for such a change. At best, a metaphysical theory might 
illuminate in a comprehensive way, our understanding of what we in the broader sense, are doing.
 is more consistent with an overall 
process view than any other focus on level of analysis, at least if we assume that Whitehead’s radical 
quantum theory of becoming is not supported. A major challenge in many empirical process studies 
is to provide reasonable accounts for the interactivity within extended - or large scale - change 
processes and to analyze the interactions of these with the micro-change processes observed at the 
narrowly observed organizational level. Micro-processes can hardly be adequately understood in 
isolation from the more extended and historical processes within which actors associate and shape 
the meaning of the particular local process.   
34
 Third, the appeal to process metaphysics as represented by Chia and Tsoukas (in terms of 
reference to its ontology or epistemology as representing a source from where to deduct a 
particular, “true”, “genuine” or otherwise far reaching “process theory” about what organizations in 
fact are) appears to be somewhat contrary to Whitehead’s philosophy: any proposition or theory 
about such entities as “organizations” that we may perceive of empirically (that are not simply 
autonomous “mental conceptions”) requires the interaction of “mental conceptions” and “physical 
interactions”. Hence, according to Whitehead, a knowledge proposition or theory about 
organizations requires empirical investigation and analysis in order to be a proposition about some 
phenomenon in the world at all. To infer something in particular about organizations from the 
perspective of process metaphysics is neither “true” nor “genuine” theory, only creative analytical 
speculation.  
 
Given the complexity and variety of the phenomena of the world, process metaphysics is more 
likely to make more salient the value of methodological and theoretical creativity and diversity in 
the processes of overall knowledge creation, than suggest the advocacy of some particular analytical 
approach to the study of empirical phenomena.  
The fundamental perspective on organizational change suggested by Tsoukas and Chia, is in 
short a version of Whitehead’s analytical theory of “the becoming of actual entities”. In addition 
they include conceptions of stabilization from categories and conceptions of recursive interaction.35
                                                 
32 Lowe, Victor (1985): Alfred North Whitehead: The Man and His Work, 1861 – 1900. Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press. p 3 
 
33 op cit p 580 
34 An analogy with respect to the relationship between the physical sciences and Whitehead’s metaphysics is 
offered by Friedrich Rapp (1990). Among other things he discusses why a highly successful area the physical 
sciences have not applied any Whiteheadian like conceptions of process. 
35 For stabilisation from categories cf Lakoff, G. (1987): Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Chicago University 
Press, and Johnson, M. (1993): Moral Imagination, University of Chicago Press; for recursive  interaction cf 
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However, the process view that they present; that organizations constantly change and become 
ordered as a result of a multiplicity of change activities, is fundamentally based on an axiomatic 
analytical construct that forms a simple tautology. This can be illustrated in the following way: 
Assume a world with the existence of only two independent (non-related) processes that evolve 
into the future. If these two processes interact with one another, the outcome of such interacting by 
logical necessity will be different at all the different points of time that this might happen. Variable 
outcomes over time – and accordingly variable processes of change – are logically unavoidable 
when you introduce such an axiomatic point of departure, even limited to only two such 
independent and interacting processes. To generalize theoretical propositions about real world 
phenomena from a perspective where phenomena such as organizations result from continuous 
change activities is a logical deduction from the axiomatic point of departure. To support this 
logical deduction by picking a number of illustrations from the ethnographic studies literature and 
from organizational studies that have been conducting detailed studies of such change activities, 
does not add much empirical validity, because such a tautological concept can be applied to any 
phenomenon to produce a perfectly reasonable description that confirms the appropriateness of 
the perspective.36
Fourth, it follows from this, that direct inferences within the realm of organization theory 
from what – in the perspective of Whiteheadian epistemology - is in fact not a theory or a judgment 
of various theories about organizations, but simply an appeal to different mental conceptions, do 
not meet reasonable requirements for scientifically based claims to any sort of normative or 
instrumental implications onto the empirical field of the subject matter. This holds equally when 
evaluated from our general perceptions of the criteria for valid knowledge as represented within the 
sciences. Hence, the argument Chia advocates, that “ 
 Most objects can indeed be described in an unlimited number of dimensions, of 
which this is certainly one. To identify such similarity does not refer to the context of empirical 
investigation, but rather to the context of conceptual justification.  
..if we follow the logic of this alternative metaphysics of change to its logical conclusion, it must 
imply that the management of change must, accordingly, entail, not the deliberate change 
oriented form of external intervention (..), but the alternative relaxing of the artificially-
imposed structures of relation: the loosening up of organizations…..”,  
is not a theoretical proposition, but an incident of creative conceptual “reversion”. Process 
metaphysics simply does not deliver theoretical implications like those suggested.  
Finally, it appears that the reference to “a metaphysics of change” as what we now need to 
develop organizational theory as opposed to “the still-dominant Parmediean-inspired metaphysics of 
substance which elevates stability, permanence and order”, leaves some room for further 
qualification. Possibly this description rather refers to the scientific context of the late 19th/early 
20th century, more than it is an accurate characterization of present state of affairs. Rather than a 
metaphysics of substance dominating Western thinking from the times of the ancient Greeks, it 
could be that is was the neoplatonist view that came to dominate over the previous Aristotelian 
scholasticism somewhere in the 17th century, that brought a fundamentally new “metaphysics of 
substance” to Western thinking. Such a view is hardly dominant any more. As noted, Whitehead’s 
opposing process metaphysics presented 80 years ago, is quite consistent with what I believe are 
taken for granted presuppositions regarding knowledge developments within the various sciences 
today – indeed also within the domain of organizational theory. I shall of course not deny that static 
conceptions and categories are widespread within organizational research. However, I will argue 
that an overall process view of organizational knowledge as well as of organizations is rather common, 
and also that organizational processes and the diverse ways we may study them, actually have 
become highly influential parts of the research area.  
Since the time of the process philosophers, it is probably a fair characterization to say that 
philosophy at large has moved away from the kind of grand unification of science metaphysics 
similar to Whiteheadian philosophy, on the reasoning that the enormous generalizations they 
required led to a flexible looseness in wording and interpretation that was experienced as rather 
unproductive. A more pragmatic view that appreciated the diversity of the sciences emerged, 
bringing focus for instance on matters of language and on analytical issues in what is commonly 
                                                                                                                                               
Von Foerster. H. (1984): “On constructing a reality”, in P. Watzlawick (ed.) The Invented Reality, W.W: Norton, 
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referred to as “Philosophy of Science”. This has grown into a diverse area of philosophy somewhat 
closer to each of the domains of the sciences. This turn - with the relative strong influence from 
philosophical pragmatism, is what may be seen to dominate an area like organizational change 
theory today, rather than, say, any metaphysics of substance. A return to cosmological philosophy 
as represented before the days of “the Philosophy of Science”, is an interesting and possibly 
stimulating voyage, but not necessarily a productive one (in the pragmatic sense).     
I have not found space here to further demonstrate that the part of Whitehead’s ontology 
where he insists on a generalized quantum theory based on “micro-events” or “actual occasions” as 
the only foundation for existence of every phenomena in the world, is in fact refuted. There is a 
substantial literature on the topic, and I find that Rescher’s explicit down-tuning of this part of 
Whitehead, could be seen as an indicative conclusion within an overall positive representation of 
process philosophy. I shall not decline from noting though, that merely the insistence on something 
particular constituting each and everything in the world (including time), appears rather counter-
intuitive – at least within the context of a contemporary acknowledgment of a diverse foundation 
for science as a whole. Whitehead’s insistence on such a unified foundational theory also appears to 
be inconsistent with other parts of Whitehead’s own thinking, as outlined in this article. It is 
important to note that the amount of “creative” thinking and “word inventions” done by 
Whitehead to overcome the difficulties of this “impossible” theoretical venture, appears to have left 
a tempting bunch of “ingenious” citations (close to true poetry) that may at least in part explain 
why Whitehead is both one of the most cited and one of the least understood philosophers of the 
previous century.   
 
 
Process versus substance view 
What then, is there to be said about the particular debate over the “process view” versus the 
“substance view”? According to Rescher, the “substance view” is representing the “opposite view” 
that identifies what constitutes process philosophy in broad terms, as what it is not. Reference to 
those representing the “substance stance” however, is limited to P. F. Stawson’s Individuals,37
Given the Whiteheadian epistemology that is generally appreciated nowadays, the relevant 
“new” aspects that may be offered by historical process philosophy are rather to be found at the 
level of mental conceptions, among its diverse representations of “the idea of process” in the shape 
of analytical conceptions that may be applied as perspectives or analytical frameworks to analyze 
complex information given by empirical fields of investigation. As is evident from the work for 
instance by Stuhre, Hernes & Bakken, Carlsen, Bordum and also Tsoukas and Chia, process 
philosophy offers a stimulating plurality of such analytical constructs. Quite similar to the 
Whiteheadian understanding of knowledge creation, there is now a common view represented by 
phenomenologists and psychologists alike that the human brain tends to organize thinking by 
means of two different processes. One of them has to do with a certain kind of hierarchical framing 
that gives a particular perspective to the flow of information that is addressed. The other concerns 
the selection, organizing and analysis of the data (information), given the framework. Hence, the 
process view and the substance view can for the most part be perceived of as different analytical 
framings. To decide upon which of them hold priority over the other, does not seem to represent a 
productive issue in relation to an empirical science like organization studies. A call for studies that 
“treat stability, order and organizations as the exceptional states that need explanation rather than 
the instances of change”
 
apparently with no further references to more recent work within this tradition. I believe it is not 
completely evident on the basis of Rescher’s book, that the general impact of the process versus 
substance controversy carries a lot of weight today. 
38
However, as is also evident from Rescher’s presentation, “process thinking” is also based on 
contentions that serve as irrefutable underpinnings (tautologies) of what typically constitutes a 
paradigm. Hence, process philosophy is said to solve a number of theoretical problems at the level 
of crude logic that demonstrates its advantages over rival logical constructs. As such, it aspires as 
 is of course a viable and practical consequence of taking a process 
perspective seriously. Whether such studies produce better theories than those we already have, 
depends on what discoveries such approached leads to – discoveries that need to be more than 
what can be said by logical deduction from their axiomatic points of departure.  
                                                 
37 Strawson P.F. “Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics  4th edition Methuen 1987 
38 Chia, 1999 op cit 
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one of the fundamental perspectives we may have, from where to derive further conceptions that 
may develop into methodologically unified areas of scientific inquiry. The lack of “definiteness” in 
the general characterization of what constitutes “process” however, is an obvious obstacle to the 
productivity of such a venture – for instance as compared to other axiomatic systems like “general 
equilibrium theory” in economics or “systems theory” in sociology. There is always the possibility 
that a logically well founded paradigm will rather produce ideology than actual knowledge, due to 
its impractical applicability to empirical investigations. However, at this point I believe the area of 
organizational research has seen some substantial progress recently, when it comes to advancing 
more operational conceptions of what constitutes a process and how it may be studied, as for 
instance represented by the introduction of “Chaos Theory”, “Actor Network Theory” and other 
methodological conceptions, as for instance influenced from the area of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS).39 Various others have emerged from case studies suggesting analytical conceptions 
inferred from narratives of observed processes40 and from the “process of sensemaking” approach 
to organizational studies.41
Finally, the theoretical concept of “mental and physical interactional bipolarity” may indeed 
represent a particularly interesting point of departure for investigations into the dynamics of 
organizational change and innovation. This is the position most explicitly taken by Sheldon, 
however Whitehead – as we have seen – also makes considerable use of this construct in his 
theorizing on the nature of creative processes. He even points at the necessary bipolarity of the 
principle of process with the opposite principle of ordering which is commonly appreciated as the 
“dilemma of innovation” within the area of innovation management studies. One interesting 
feature with analytical conceptions based on a bipolar geometry is that these establishe a “free space 
for agency” by which to escape from “logical” determinism given by unitary conceptions. This is a 
particularly interesting feature within the social sciences where agency creates such a huge potential 
for variation in processes and outcomes that are otherwise also influenced by other kinds of 
tangible and intangible forces. The conception of bipolarity is what Hernes and Bakken explore in 
their analysis of the relationship between, and the mutual transformation of, nouns and verbs in 
organizational theorizing (the interrelatedness and bipolarity of verbs and nouns). It appears that 
perhaps some of the most useful contributions that we might draw from Whitehead relate to his 
sophisticated work on “prehension” understood as “mental and physical bipolar interactivities”. 
The recent emergence and growth of various network theories in the area of innovation studies as 
well as within business strategy and logistics, appears to justify the appropriateness of such an 
analytical conception to management studies.  
  
 
 
Alternative approaches for studying organizational change  
There has been a substantial turn towards “process studies” in recent years. The seminal work by 
Van de Ven et al in the so called “Minnesota studies” represents but one major contribution. One 
of the interesting parts of their work, is that it introduces and draws on “chaos theory” in 
organizational and management research, which conceptually has some similarities with 
                                                 
39 See for instance Pickering (A. (1995): The mangle of practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Giere. 
Ronald N. (1999): Science without laws. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Kaufmann, Stuart (1993): The 
origin of order. New York: Oxford University Press 
40 Pettigrew, Andrew (1990): “Longitudinal field research on change: Theory and practice”, Organization Science 
1(3): 267-292, (2001): “Management research after modernism”, British Journal of Management 12/Special Issue: 
S61-S70, and (1997): “What is a processual analysis?” Scandinavian Journal of Management. 13/4: 337-348; 
Nonaka, I. (1994): “A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. Organization Science 5/1: 14-37; 
Langley, A (1999): “Strategies for theorizing from process data”, Academy of Management Review 24: 691-710; 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989): “Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity environments”, Academy of Management 
Journal, 32: 543-576; Dansereau, F., F.J. Yammarino and J. C. Kohles (1999): “Multiple levels of analysis from 
longitudinal perspective: Some implications for theory building, Academy of Management Review 24: 346-357 
41 As represented by Weick, Karl E. (1995): Sensemaking in Organizations, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Dutton, J. E. (1993): “The making of organizational environments: An interpretive pathway to organizational 
change” in L.L. Cummings, B.M. Staw (eds.): Research in Organizational Behavior, 15, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT: 
1995-226; also Gioia, D.A. and K. Chittipeddi (1991): “Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change 
initiation. Strategic Management Journal, 12:433-448, and Weick, Karl E., Kathleen M. Sutcliffe and David 
Obstfeld (2005): “Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking”, Organization Science, 16/4: 409-421 
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Whitehead’s “quantum theory” drawn from physics, in the sense that “data” are seen as collections 
of fluctuating processes that may organize into relative stable patterns or identities by statistical 
regularities. The studies bring significant new insights into the particular aspects of processes that 
are captured by the “pattern seeking” analytical approach in combination with a systematic 
empirical methodology to obtain and analyze perceptual data across real time observations. Hence, 
chaos theory obviously has become part of the methodological repertoire of organizational process 
studies. How much closer to “true Whiteheadian process thinking” can you get? 
 
I would also like finally to give a few thoughts to Van de Ven & Poole’s42
 
 suggested typology and 
discussion of alternative research methods for studying organizational change which is based on 
their different ontological and epistemological positions in relation to process thinking.  
Their call for plurality in methods on the basis that insights gained from different kinds of studies 
are fundamentally complementary to one another appears to be quite in line with a process view – 
at least in the Whiteheadian sense. The creative potential represented by the multiplicity of 
conceptions, studies and propositions offered, must be part of the basis for achieving future 
scientific progress – which is evidently an evolutionary process. This is also completely in line with 
an overall pragmatist conception, by which the various approaches will finally be evaluated in terms 
of their relative contributions to knowledge as valued by society at large. I also find that their 
classification and discussion of the various methods are illuminating and clarifying with respect to 
the contributions from each category of studies. Their discussion is also firmly grounded in an 
extended discussion of research methods within the area of organization studies – in particular 
since around 1990. As such, it represents a neat outline and an appropriate conclusion from a 
lengthy discussion.   
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to explore into the debate within management and organization research 
on the suggested turn to a more fundamental process thinking by pulling directly from historical 
process philosophy. The ambition has been to bring more clarity to this debate regarding some of 
the basic characteristics of process philosophy, in order to illuminate and assess both constraints 
and potentials. The exploration of Whitehead’s philosophy in this paper is not an attempt at a 
complete dismantling of his thinking, but aims at illuminating some of the challenges that raises 
from the call for more fundamental process thinking inspired from early 1900 process philosophy.  
 
An overall conclusion is that the call for historical process metaphysics as represented by late 20th 
century philosophers such as Pierce, James, Bergson, Dewey, Whitehead and Sheldon to support a 
radical turn towards a more “true” or “genuine” process based approach to organizational research, 
is hardly as appropriate or productive as claimed by some. At the level of analytical 
conceptualization however, the philosophical tradition offers interesting and potentially useful 
contributions that deserve further exploration within management and organization research. This 
indeed includes elements of Whitehead’s own work. Some of these elements offer particularly 
interesting conceptual contributions to organizational change and innovation process studies. As 
examples from other management researchers indicate, there might be even more to be harvested 
from the other process philosophers that I have not had the opportunity to investigate further in 
this article. 
 
At the level of research methodology, the analysis is inconclusive at the specific level. However in 
the general perspective of process philosophy, methodological pluralism and creativity at the level 
of empirical science is supported.  
 
It is also fair to conclude that Whitehead’s epistemology is nowadays generally appreciated through 
out the empirical sciences – including of course management and organization research. There are 
of course instances still, by which someone appears to infer theory about empirical phenomena 
simply through logical deductions from higher order analytical conceptions. This – according to 
Whitehead – is to conduct “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness”.  It is to confuse the context of 
                                                 
42 Op cit 2005 
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analytical justification with the context of empirical investigation in the process of theory 
development.  
 
Whitehead’s ontology leaves a divided impression. On the one hand, his ambitious attempt to 
reinvent a radical new and unified cosmological theory of relativity on the basis of first and 
foremost “quantum theory” in physics, appears both to have been too radical and to have been 
refuted or at least disregarded by later process philosophers. The so called “strong” ontological 
view on the priority of process over substance thereby appears to have lost an influential advocacy. 
However, it appears that the “weak” view is consistent with what stands out as the most substantial 
contribution from Whitehead’s philosophy to science theory, namely that this version adequately 
deals with the many different notions of “process” articulated in management and organizational 
studies and that the view also adequately deals with the general process of advancing management 
and organization theory. The other part of Whitehead’s ontology where he outlines the principle of 
“creativity” by means of interactions within a bipolar conception of mental vs. physical 
interrelatedness, has a particular resonance within the numerous network-based theories of 
organizational and innovative activities across the management sciences. A more concentrated 
study of these Whiteheadian conceptions appears particularly interesting to “process view” studies 
as of today. 
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